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Callon's anthropology of markets thus differs from traditional economic sociology (even 'new' economic sociology) in its conceptualisation of the actor. 'Action', writes Callon (2005, p. 4) , 'including its reflexive dimension that produces meaning, takes place in hybrid collectives', collectives that incorporate 'material and technical devices, texts, etc.' as well as human beings.
In Callon's analysis, therefore, an economic actor is not an individual human being, nor even a human being 'embedded in institutions, conventions, personal relationships or groups'. For Callon, an actor is 'made up of human bodies but also of prostheses, tools, equipment, technical devices, algorithms, etc'. -in other words is made up of an agencement (Callon 2005, p. 4) . The notion of agencement is drawn from Deleuze (for example, Deleuze and Guattari 2004, Wise 2005) , and involves a deliberate word-play. Agencer is to arrange or to fit together: in one sense, un agencement is thus an assemblage, arrangement, configuration or lay-out. The referent in everyday speech is often down-to-earth and material, such as the parts of a machine; indeed, in ordinary parlance, les agencements are fixtures and fittings, and to be bien agencé is to be well-equipped (Collin, Knox, Ledésert, and Ledésert 1982) .
The other side of the word-play in the term agencement is agence, agency.
(We retain the French 'agencement' because this word-play does not carry over into its usual English rendering as 'assemblage', which thus has somewhat too passive a connotation.) As Callon and Caliskan put it: 'Agencements denote sociotechnical arrangements when they are considered from the point [of] view of their capacity to act and to give meaning to action'. Actors do not have inherent properties or a fixed ontology. Their characteristics are constituted by the agencements of which they are 4 made up: 'Depending on the nature of the arrangements, of the framing and attribution devices, we can consider agencies reduced to adaptive behaviours, reflexive agencies, calculative or non-calculative agencies, or disinterested or selfish ones, that may be either collective or individual … (Re)configuring an agency means (re)configuring the socio-technical agencements constituting it, which requires material, textual and other investments' (Callon and Caliskan 2005, pp. 24-25) .
The existing body of research that is closest to the conception of economic actors as made up of agencements is the literature on distributed cognition, especially the work of Hutchins (e.g. 1995a&b) . Hutchins argues that to understand cognition 'in the wild' one must go beyond the analysis 'of the individual bounded by the skin': such cognition frequently involve multiple collaborating human beings interacting with artefacts (his prime example is navigation as conducted in U.S. warships).
' [L] ocal functional systems composed of a person in interaction with a tool have cognitive properties that are radically different from the cognitive properties of the person alone', and a 'group performing [a] cognitive task may have cognitive properties that differ from the cognitive properties of any individual'. Human beings, argues Hutchins, 'create their cognitive powers by creating the environments in which they exercise those powers ' (1995a, pp. xvi, 176 and 289) .
All sociologists know that group cognitive processes differ from those of individuals, and Hutchins's emphasis on the constitutive role of artefacts in cognition is also now widely accepted. However, Callon's closely-related approach has been intensely controversial within economic sociology and economic anthropology (see, e.g, Miller 2002 ), mainly because of one specific feature. Callon's view of the 5 economic actor as having a variable ontology implies that it is possible for economics to be 'performative': for actors to be configured into the calculative egoists posited by orthodox economics, and for economies to be configured in such a way that the postulates of economics have empirical validity. A 'statement' (a proposition, an equation, a model, a method, a tool …) can be made to work if the corresponding agencement can be constructed (Callon forthcoming) .
In this paper, we do not directly address the debate surrounding the performativity of economics (see MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu forthcoming), but take a more modest tack. 'The performativity program', writes Callon (2005, p. 5) 'starts with an ethnography of socio-technical agencements', and it is to that ethnography that we seek to contribute. We take one example of an actor in financial markets, and document the agencement that makes it up: the arrangement (in the broadest sense) of people, technical systems, and so on that constitutes it.
Our overall purpose is to elucidate what it means to view an economic actor as constituted by an agencement, and to discuss the merits of doing so. However, we hope that the paper also has empirical virtues. The actor we have chosen is a hedge fund. Such funds are of growing importance in the global financial markets, but have been the object of remarkably little social-science attention outside of financial economics. Indeed, this paper contains what is, to our knowledge, the first study of a hedge fund that includes direct observation (albeit brief observation) of its operations.
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Although they have not so far focused on hedge funds, there have been a number of sociological or anthropological observational studies of actors and action in financial markets. The literature on workplace ethnography and computersupported collaborative work (which is closely related to, and sometimes directly inspired by, Hutchins's approach) contains one particularly helpful study of a City of London dealing room (Heath, Jirotka, Luff, and Hindmarsh 1993) , and ethnographic studies (for example, Abolafia 1996 , Zaloom 2003 have also been central in the recent rise of 'social studies of finance' (for which see Knorr Cetina and Preda
2005).
Two ethnographies have been especially helpful in informing our study. First, Knorr Cetina and Bruegger focus in their study of foreign exchange trading on the computer screens on which market data are displayed. These screens, they note, are 'appresentational' devices, making 'that which is geographically distant ... interactionally present ' (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger 2002, p. 909) , a role which screens also play in the fund we observed. Such screens do not represent a market that exists independently of them: they are one of its conditions of possibility, allowing geographically-dispersed actors to constitute as well as to observe 'the market' to which they are all oriented.
The second particularly relevant ethnography is Beunza and Stark (2004) . The trading room they studied differs from ours, containing many more people (it belonged to an investment bank, not a hedge fund). However, their emphasis on the trading room as an 'interpretive community', deliberately aided by its physical layout, carries over to our study, as does their focus on the way in which '[c]alculative practices are distributed across persons and instruments' (Beunza and Stark 2004, pp. 370 and 372) . This paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss hedge funds, outline the pilot study of one such fund that is this paper's focus, and briefly discuss wider research that places it in context. Next, we describe the physical setting of the fund's trading, the assets it trades, and the arrangements that make it possible for a small number of people to engage in global trading. We then discuss briefly a typical calculational tool the fund employs and outline more extensively the social distribution of cognition underpinning its trading. We note that some of this cognition takes place at distant sites and also that the information processing it involves has to be selective. The penultimate section examines two aspects of this selectivity: its geographical focus, and the extent to which attention is paid to political developments. The paper's conclusion outlines a variety of ways in which viewing hedge funds as made up of agencements may be consequential.
Studying a Hedge Fund
The category of 'hedge fund' is a creation of law and of regulation, brought into being by the wave of securities regulation that followed the Wall Street crash of 1929 and subsequent Great Depression. Some limited exceptions aside, the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940 made it illegal for investment companies to short sell (to sell securities they do not own, for example borrowing them in the hope of later repurchasing them at a lower price) or to use leverage (to buy securities using borrowed funds). In consequence, any economic actor in the U.S. desiring the 8 capacity to act in those ways had to configure itself so that it was not an 'investment company' within the meaning of the act. What is generally regarded as the first hedge fund was A.W. Jones & Co., set up in 1949. (Jones had a PhD in sociology from Columbia University, but to our disappointment we can find no connection between his academic work and his hedge fund.) Jones's striking success was made public by an article in Fortune (Loomis 1966) , and it began to attract imitators, as, later, did George Soros's Quantum Fund.
The hedge-fund sector has not enjoyed entirely smooth growth -there have been well In 1990, there were fewer than 1,000 hedge funds, managing $25bn in assets; in 2004, there were more than 8,000 funds, managing almost $1,000bn; 4 by March 2006, assets under management had risen to over $1,500bn (Schurr 2006) . At the time of writing in April 2006, hedge funds may be about to move into the retail investment mainstream for the first time. The U.K. Financial Services Authority is considering adding 'funds of funds' (which, as the name suggests, invest in portfolios of hedge funds) to its authorised product list and allowing them to take investments from the general public.
Hedge funds' annual management fees of 1 to 2 percent are in line with those of other actively-managed investments, but they also charge a performance fee, typically 20 percent of profits -that is, of increases in net asset value. (Normally, net asset value has to rise above its 'high-water mark' in previous periods before this fee applies.) To curb the incentive to excessive risk-taking created by this fee structure, hedge fund managers are conventionally expected to have as much as half of their own personal net worth invested in the fund that they manage, so that they suffer losses as well as benefit from gains. We draw upon three data sources. The first is a brief period of observation of the fund's trading (in a group as small as five, the presence of even a single researcher is intrusive, so we felt it unreasonable to ask for prolonged access). We observed this trading during the first week of January 2005. 6 Because Monday 3 January was a market holiday, our observations cover four days. The first-named author was present throughout; the second-named for part of 4 January and all of 5 January. Mostly, we simply took notes, but the fund allowed us to tape-record the 'strategy' meetings it holds at 9.00 a.m. each morning, and as we began to develop a sense of which trading-room verbal interactions were interesting analytically, we sought and were granted permission to tape-record those too. 6 In certain markets -notably that for small-capitalisation stocks -behaviour in December and January has unusual aspects to do with matters such as the end of the U.S. tax year (Reinganum 1983) , but as far as we could tell there was no such effect on what we were observing.
Partner B sometimes trades, but partner A was responsible for all the trading during our observations (references below to 'the trader' are always to partner A).
While observing as best we could what others did and said, we concentrated our attention on him. He allowed us to sit behind him, slightly to one side; we could observe all his actions and all the visible objects of his attention (see figure 1 ). We could hear his part in all telephone conversations, and we were also able to listen to telephone conference calls. We occasionally asked the trader to explain actions he had just taken, trying to time such inquiries so as not to disturb the flow of his actions. (Heath, Jirotka, Luff, and Hindmarsh [1993] outline the cues participants in dealing rooms use to avoid disrupting others' action sequences.)
The trader seemed remarkably unperturbed by this close observation, but plainly our presence could have affected what he or his colleagues did. However, it is worth noting that the focus of our observations was behaviour that is central to effective trading. Investors in hedge funds often judge them on their performance month-tomonth, especially in the case of a relatively new fund (as this one was), and in that context four trading days are consequential. To depart from successful routines would have had a high cost, and the impression we have is that the trader and his colleagues did not allow our presence to disturb their actions in this respect.
Our second source of information is follow-up interviews with the trader and partners B, C and D, and informal meetings held with the trader by the first author on 13 several occasions. Those interviews and meetings allowed us, for example, to inquire whether events we had seen were unusual or typical and enabled us to investigate a matter that our wider research increasingly suggested was important: the extent to which the agencement constituting a hedge fund involves people and technical systems in other physical locations. Our third source of data is electronic mail. The trader permitted us to forward to ourselves nearly all the electronic mail messages he received and sent during the period of our observation. (No selectivity on his part was involved: we simply ran out of time to forward the complete set of messages.)
Printed out, these e-mails fill eight lever-arch files.
Beyond the fund on which we focus in this paper, we are conducting a snowballsample study (so far involving 29 interviewees) of traders in other hedge funds and investment banks, of those who manage such traders and provide them with other services, and of the 'funds of funds' that are now the dominant category of investor in hedge funds. When an interview is quoted without attribution to our fund's trader or one of his colleagues, the quotation comes from this wider set of interviews.
The Arrangement of Trading
Since an agencement is an arrangement, let us begin with lay-out. In January 2005, the hedge fund we studied leased two modest rooms in a shared office building. One room was used for the 9.00 a.m. and other meetings and for some conference calls.
The other, where most of the action we observed took place, could have been mistaken for normal accommodation for clerical workers, except for two features (see The governments of all the countries in which the fund specialises issue bonds in their own or foreign currency. Bonds are tradeable debt securities that typically commit their issuer to repay the capital sum (the principal) on a given 'maturity' date and to pay 'coupons' (periodic, normally fixed, interest payments) until that date.
They are the main means by which both developed and emerging-market governments bridge the shortfall between revenues and expenditures, a shortfall they nearly all encounter almost continuously. The capacity for successful bond issuance enhances a government's freedom of action: money can be spent now -on infrastructure, education, health, war-fighting, and so on -and repaid only in the future, and governments frequently pay the principal on existing bonds that have The fund we studied also trades currencies, but the core of its trading is of bonds and bond-derivatives such as bond futures (a 'future' is a standardised exchange-traded contract equivalent economically to a commitment to a future purchase or sale of the asset in question at a set price) and credit default swaps (which are contracts equivalent to insurance against a bond issuer defaulting). The bonds the The fund is also linked electronically to its 'prime broker', a leading international investment bank. When the fund agrees a trade, the prime broker makes the necessary transfers of the electronic traces of money or of title to securities. (A bond, for example, is now almost never a paper certificate: it is an item in an electronic database.) The bank commits itself to make these transfers even if the fund is unable to pay for them, thus facilitating the fund's trading in an additional sense: the fund's counterparties know that not just its creditworthiness, but the bank's, stands behind the trades.
Data transfers from the fund's technical systems to the bank's make it possible for the latter to monitor the fund's risk-taking and its cash flow. At the end of every trading day, the bank's system 'sweeps' the dozens of trading positions that make up the fund's account, and places excess cash on overnight interest-bearing deposit. When the fund is short (has sold securities it does not own, the capacity to do which is, as noted above, almost a defining feature of a hedge fund as an economic actor), the bank will try hard to lend it the requisite securities, either from its own inventory or elsewhere, even if they are 'hard-to-borrow'.
Distributing Cognition
The fund's capacity to enact trades thus depends on people and technical systems not physically present in its trading room. So too its capacity to know which trades to enact. The fund deals in the currencies and government securities of far-flung countries with complex economies and intricate politics, securities that are entitlements to payments that are sometimes far in the future. Who, for example, can confidently know whether the fiscal situation of a government that has issued a 30-year bond will be good enough for it to repay the principal when it finally falls due?
The decisions to be made are difficult ones, and the amount of potentiallyrelevant information is vast. Much of it is available in the trading room directly onscreen. The whir of discs and fans aside, silence, punctuated only by typing, often prevails in the trading room for minutes on end, despite mass-media portrayals of such rooms in a frenzy of hubbub. Sitting at their desks, their attention on their screens in the manner described by Knorr Cetina and Bruegger (2002), the trader and his colleagues almost continually sift this incoming flow of information.
There was a striking contrast between the small group of people in a modest office in a nondescript London building and the quantity and geographical scope of the information flowing in. what goes on in the trading room is indeed 'distributed cognition' in Hutchins's sense.
For example, a technical tool on which all bond traders depend is a yield calculator. The complicated diversity of bond prices frequently needs converted quickly to and from a more uniform metric. Thinking in terms of yields enables different bonds to be compared, and indeed it is common for bond prices to be quoted, or bond-auction bids to be priced, not as sums in dollars or other currencies, but as yields. In today's financial markets, the calculation of yields has become a routine, 'black box' software feature. However, an incident on the second day of our observations suddenly rendered it visible.
The trader asked his assistant to produce a software-implemented calculator to enable price quotations for Turkish government bonds in the form of yields to be converted to and from lira prices. The assistant did so, employing the standard definition 20 of 'yield' as the average annual rate of return offered by a bond over its entire remaining lifespan at its current market price, which is calculated by finding, by iteration, the discount rate at which the sum of the present values of the bond's coupons and principal equals its market price. The trader, however, quickly saw that his assistant's calculator was wrong. The assistant did not have a crucial piece of 'local knowledge' -the convention in the Turkish bond market is to employ not the standard definition of yield but the annual coupon payments expressed as a percentage of market price:
Trader: Turkish T-bills work on a simple yield and not a compound yield. Did you know that?
Assistant: No.
Once corrected, the Turkish yield calculator becomes part of the sociotechnical agencement that constitutes the hedge fund. The calculator's construction is itself heterogeneous. It mixes programming expertise, knowledge of market convention, and specialised factual knowledge: the coupon rates of Turkish government bonds with specific maturities. Two people produce it: the trader could in principle have written it himself, but in practice he needs to delegate the task, and also to assess whether it has been carried out to his satisfaction. In these aspects, the Turkish yield calculator is unusual only in that we were present as it was being On other occasions, however, the trader will do no more than acknowledge the comment ('Yeah, I saw it'), or will not reply at all.
Although the trader has evident confidence in his views, he acknowledges that others have expertise that he does not: in particular, the 'strategist', partner C. His role is to follow economic and political developments in emerging-market countries but also (for reasons we explore below) economic developments in other countries:
mainly, but not exclusively, the United States. The following exchange, for example, took place after the monthly release of the U.S. employment figures, the data event during the period of our observations to which by far the most attention was devoted.
The trader and partner C are looking at the same information screens during the exchange, and the trader is simultaneously trying to complete the purchase of some Partner C: In a word, I would say unchanged.
Trader: Right, thank you. But don't you think that market professionals will look through the numbers and they will imply something for inflation?
Or that's not going to happen?
Partner C: You asked for one word say I gave you the, yeah, I'll embellish a bit more. Yeah, it's as I said. It appears that Christmas was kind of, overall it was okay for retailers. It was okay because they were discounting to move the merchandise. So that's positive for inflation, for December anyway … But you have to weigh that up against the fact that the average hourly earnings was a bit higher than expected.
Trader: Right.
Partner C: So.
Trader:
That's what I meant about the, reading through those … Partner C: Yeah, that's why I say unchanged because there are these cross currents going through.
That was an exchange about the bearing of economic conditions on the U.S. bond market. Other exchanges between the trader and partners B and C debate specific features of trades. 
Multi-Site Cognition
The cognitive processes that inform the fund's decision making are distributed more widely than over the people and technical systems in its trading room. These electronic mail messages thus generally serve to draw the trader's attention to some of the data items available to him, and not to others of those items, and often explicitly or implicitly suggest 'framings': ways of interpreting data items (see Beunza and Garud 2004) . For the trader and his colleagues to monitor all available data items would be infeasible. The constant arrival of 'pointers' reduces the need to attempt to do so, and sometimes feeds directly into action. Clearly, the messages quoted above differ. Sender 1 is drawing attention to a news item, and offering a personal opinion. Sender 2 draws attention to a forthcoming data announcement (many incoming messages do this), and, in respect to Mexico, offers his investment bank's explicit trading advice. The messages from senders 3, 4, 5, and 6 take the form of reports on or analyses of market developments:
no advice is explicit, but only a brave recipient would receive sender 6's message and promptly buy Brazilian government bonds.
Many more such messages flow into the fund than flow out of it, and of course we could not observe the processes that led to the incoming messages. We did, however, witness the formulation within the fund of a trading idea that it chose to disseminate, and were able to follow the early stages of its dissemination. Partner B noticed that the 'sell off' of emerging-market bonds referred to in the above messages had led to an apparent anomaly in the relative pricing of two different Brazilian government U.S. Dollar bonds. The trader asked his assistant to construct a spreadsheet of recent prices of the two bonds, which supported the view that it was indeed an anomaly and thus a trading opportunity. Having first made the necessary purchases and short sales to take advantage of it, the trader then phoned a contact in an investment bank to direct his attention to the anomaly -'There is at least half a point in that trade, and there is zero market risk' -and sent him the spreadsheet.
Why should traders share such ideas with others? If an idea is a good one, a rational economic actor might be expected to keep it to himself or herself. However, all traders are capital-constrained: there are limits to the amount of capital they have available to them, and prudential constraints that prevent them devoting too much of it to a single trade. Having devoted as much capital as reasonable to a trade -explaining to us the positions he had taken, the trader said 'This is the right size for this anomaly' -they thus lose nothing by alerting others to it.
Furthermore, there is sometimes something to gain by alerting others. 'All I want is people even to talk about it', said the trader: if others also took action on the pricing anomaly, they would prevent it widening. Should it widen, explained the Members of investment banks have an additional motivation for disseminating trading ideas (their own, and those they receive from others such as the fund we studied).
Fees paid by hedge funds for prime-brokerage services are now a major income source for those banks, and hedge-fund trading benefits them also via commissions and the bidask spread (the difference between the prices at which they will buy and sell a security), and -iteratively -via the way in which knowledge of trading flows makes opportunities visible to them.
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The sources of ideas for trading (or of other results of information-sifting) are thus economic actors in their own right, who can be presumed often to have an interest in what others will do when they receive them. It is in effect expected that market participants will 'talk their book' when circulating ideas for trading -that they will already hold a position the virtues of which they are propounding -and a certain amount of 'gilding' or exaggeration in so doing is discounted (less pardonable is 'sandbagging' [Biggs 2006, pp. 2-3] : advocating a position while oneself unwinding it). It is important that many of the exchanges we are discussing (such as the emails about Philippine bonds) are multilateral, so that opportunism that leads to an idiosyncratic viewpoint may be detectable. As the trader says, 'it's fairly obvious … because you can see if one person is saying A, and everybody else is saying the opposite'.
Furthermore, some sources of ideas or sifting are more credible and more authoritative than others. As the trader puts it: 'some people are more informed; … some people are more thoughtful, sophisticated; some people are simpler, you know they have sort of based their decisions on hunches and so forth… so there's a difference in style, and I don't like to pigeonhole this guy is always right, this guy is always wrong… but of course they have, you have some sort of a bias whether, you know, how they think, and their style… and you factor that into your decision'. Partner B likewise notes: 'as you talk to all those people day after day after day, you kind of develop a feel for who has the right mindset and who doesn't … you will feel that, yeah, this guy has a good call on the market and that guy not so much'.
Selectivity in Information Sifting
Fully to characterize the sifting of information that goes on within the fund's trading room and in other locations connected electronically to it is a task beyond this paper.
Here, we discuss only two aspects. The first is geographical: the surprising extent to which the attention of our fund was actually directed to the U.S. As already seen, although the fund trades the bonds of countries such as Brazil and the Philippines it nevertheless paid detailed attention to matters such as, for example, the pre-Christmas retail market in the U.S. Our follow-up interviews confirmed that that was not unusual. Partner C reckons that the weight given to international factors -'usually the U.S., really' -in the fund's decisions is around 30-40 percent, with considerations specific to the emerging-market country in question accounting for around 60-70 percent.
The metric of 'yield' allows the vast range of bonds issued worldwide quickly and easily to be compared. For example, the yield of the dollar-denominated bonds issued by Brazil or the Philippines can be compared with the yield of similar U.S.
Treasury bonds, and the perceived probabilities of default by Brazil or by the Philippines are condensed into 'credit spreads' of the yields of their bonds over
Treasuries. Indeed, a price quotation for an emerging-market bond will often take the form of a spread of its yield over comparable Treasuries.
The valuation of emerging-market bonds as spreads over U.S. or Euro government bonds means that, ceteris paribus, the price of the former will move in line with movements in the latter. However, our fund 'hedges out' this direct connection by taking offsetting positions in U.S. and Euro bond futures. A less direct link nevertheless remains. If domestic investments in the U.S. earn only low yields, emerging-market bonds (with the additional 'spreads' they offer) seem to become more attractive. Amongst the consequences can be an improvement in the perceived creditworthiness of emerging-market governments: more attractive bonds mean lowered debt-service costs and thus improved budget balances, and an increased possibility of selling bonds with longer maturities, which has the effect of reducing the risks intrinsic to frequent refinancing. In contrast, if U.S. yields rise, emergingmarket bonds lose some of their attractiveness, and this virtuous circle can reverse, with perceived government creditworthiness declining and credit spreads widening.
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In consequence, U.S. interest rates and bond yields affect not just the overall levels of emerging-market bond yields but also the spread of those yields over Treasuries, a factor to which our fund is exposed. Much of the action in emergingmarket bonds that we observed had to do with the release on the night of 4-5 January of the minutes of the December meeting of the U.S. Federal Reserve's interest-ratesetting Open Market Committee, which indicated a clearly increased probability of interest-rate rises to come. Despite the protection offered by the trader's hedges, it is thus not surprising that on the morning of 5 January we observed him reading those minutes with great care. They were the key interpretive context for the emerging- A second issue concerning selectivity in cognition is the extent to which attention is paid to the politics of the emerging-market countries in whose bonds the fund invests. At one point, we noticed the trader carefully reading a news story about Abdalá Bucaram, the maverick, populist former President of Ecuador, styled (by himself, as well as by his enemies) el loco, the madman. This story had not arrived via an e-mail message, and it prompted us to ask the trader how important a consideration was the politics of the countries whose bonds he traded.
His answer was succinct and general: 'The weaker the credit, the more important the politics'. The higher the probability of a government defaulting on its bonds, the more salient is information on that country's politics. A single trader spending a few minutes reading a news story is of course a weak datum, but the trader's explanation is consistent with the extensive study by Mosley (2003) . A key bond-market divide is between governments that are reckoned reasonably likely to default, and those whose default is regarded as effectively inconceivable. Ecuador is in the first camp. The U.K. and U.S. are in the second camp, and Chile has made partial, sometimes painful progress towards joining them.
Bond investors monitor both camps in respect to government deficits, inflation and interest-rate decisions, but 'politics' in countries in the second camp tends to be of interest only to the extent to which it is likely to affect these factors. (Only 58% of Mosley's interviewees mentioned elections in such countries as a factor they took into account, and of those who mentioned them almost nine-tenths said they were not important: Mosley 2003, 
Conclusion
The notion of 'agencement' does not displace the classic analytical tool-set of economic sociology. Social networks, for example, plainly still matter, as when one prime-broking investment bank suggests on its website that 'leveraging of relationships with custody banks' helps give it its crucial capacity to facilitate the borrowing of securities.
Nevertheless, 'agencement' is a potentially useful broadening of that tool-set, in particular in its emphasis on 'technical' linkages as well as on 'social'ones.
The risk of broadening, however, is that it becomes indiscriminate. The task of tracing an agencement in an interconnected world is formally endless, and the notion could become simply a jargon into which to translate banal description and narrative, as happened to some degree when actor-network concepts first became fashionable in English-language science and technology studies some 15 years ago. It is thus essential to be selective: to focus, for example, on aspects of agencements that are not obvious and on ways in which the composition and configuration of agencements affect economic action.
At the most basic level, the notion of 'agencement' helpfully directs us to the conditions of possibility of economic actors: the often-ignored infrastructure that enables them to be the actors they are. Why are there now over 8,000 hedge funds? The reasons of course include economic and political developments, but it is also important that setting up a hedge fund is much easier in 2006 than it was 20 years ago. The real-time interconnection of trade-capture and other systems makes it possible to standardise, automate and risk-manage administrative and prime-brokerage services, which can thus be supplied on an industrial (rather than 'cottage industry') scale and relatively cheaply.
It is worth noting that it is in the infrastructure of economic action -rather than in what we might call action's glamorous agential nodes, such as trading -that employment is largely to be found. While we know of no precise breakdown of finance-sector employment in this respect, it is clear that traders are only a small minority. The vast bulk of jobs concern other roles in agencements. Their gender balance is different:
trading is still mainly a male preserve, but more women are to be found in the infrastructure that underpins it. The geographical location of the infrastructural jobs also differs, at least potentially, from that of the glamorous ones. The Republic of Ireland, for instance, is not a prominent site of trading but has become perhaps the world's leading site of hedge-fund administration, providing not just 'offshore' legal status and a favourable tax regime, but also a robust communications infrastructure. ('Locating computers in a place with hurricanes, it's just not … a good plan', noted one interviewee from the world of administration, explaining why the Cayman Islands were unattractive in this respect despite their tax advantages.) Ireland also offers trained English-speaking staff and responsive regulation: 'in Dublin, you can go and visit the regulator ... have a cup of coffee', said the same interviewee.
A smoothly-functioning infrastructure is normally invisible: we had deliberately to seek out the infrastructure of our fund's economic action, rather than it being drawn to our attention by events in the trading-room. However, in the wider hedge-fund world there are ways in which apparently infrastructural issues can suddenly impinge on freedom of action. Thus one main means by which risk is controlled in that world is 'mark-to-market' collateralisation of contracts. As market prices move in favour of one or other party to a contract, collateral assets are transferred between them: such transfer now often take place daily.
In the words of one interviewee, it is logical to meet such 'mark-to-market calls'
by pledging out 'the most illiquid collateral that you have that fits the collateral requirements'. So what remains in a hedge fund's easily-grasped 'box' (the unlent and unpledged securities that it owns) will often tend to be its most liquid assets. Under normal circumstances this is unimportant, but when a fund suddenly needs cash (for example because of investor withdrawals or of mark-to-market requirements that must be met in cash) it can be consequential, especially if combined with technical systems that have not been set up to include fields that allow the fund readily to determine matters such as how quickly assets pledged as collateral can be reclaimed and made available for sale:
The market starts to go down, now you got to sell something, because you're getting calls all over the place on mark-to-market. As well as agencement constituting the conditions of possibility of economic action, the distribution of cognition and of action it involves may shape the properties of actors. As already noted, orthodox finance theory posits (for the purposes of modelling) an investor who is a completely rational individual with unlimited cognitive capacities, but has been challenged by 'behavioural finance'.
This also views investors as individuals, but sees them as hampered by the systematic cognitive biases revealed by experiments of the kind conducted by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and summarised in their 'prospect theory'. One such bias is a systematic tendency to behave differently in situations of perceived gain (in which many subjects become risk-averse, unwilling to take the chance of losing what they have won) and perceived loss, in which the propensity is to gamble to recoup the loss. However, also note that economically rational action may not always promote stability. Another possible effect of the composition and configuration of agencements is on the risk of contagion: the spread of a financial crisis in one country to others, including countries with few trade or other connections to the original site. With many countries in which to invest, highly selective information-processing routines are likely to be optimal (Calvo and Mendoza 2000) , and we certainly observed such selectivity. It would, for example, be most unlikely to be cost-effective for our fund to hire a Magyar-speaking economist to deepen its understanding of Hungary, one market amongst many in which it operates.
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There may in consequence be situations in which the optimal strategy for actors who spread their investments over many countries involves imitation: if an actor observes other actors -especially those judged to have expert understanding of the country in question -buying or selling, it may be sensible to do the same as quickly as possible. We should emphasize that we did not witness our fund behaving in this way, but our observations (and the corpus of e-mails to the trader) contain ample evidence of the circulation of information about particular classes of actor buying and selling. What is, however, harder to observe is why an actor is buying or selling. A sale of assets in one country may, for instance, arise simply because losses have been incurred in other countries with minimal economic links to it. Such sales may not convey any information, superior or otherwise, about the country in question, but may be misinterpreted as conveying 'bad news' (Calvo and Mendoza 2000) . Agency is of course commonly attributed to individual human beings such as the trader, but is also often attributed to 'higher-level' entities. Our hedge fund, for example, is a legal entity, and the law of contract attributes agency to it, not to the individuals who comprise it: the trader may speak or write the words, but it is the fund, not him as individual, which makes a deal and takes on a commitment.
Under some circumstances, too, market configurations can be such that agency can seem to have left particular economic actors and to reside in the market as a whole:
for example, in the crisis surrounding LTCM, hedge funds often had little or no choice as to their courses of action (MacKenzie 2003) . The attribution of agency to 'the market' is indeed common when it is an entity invoked in political discourse, both right-and leftwing. More exotically, economic agency is also sometimes attributed to entities smaller than human beings, such as specific brain structures. Successfully doing so requires an agencement including specialist technical equipment, in particular a magnetic-resonance brain scanner, and is the terrain of the fascinating new field of 'neuroeconomics' (see, for example, Saufey et al. 2003) .
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The attribution of agency may seem an esoteric, academic issue, but for financialmarket practitioners it is in fact a pervasive concern. Much of the rewards to traders and those immediately around them come in the form of bonuses that are supposed to reflect individual contributions to a firm's profits. Because agencement is collective, this 'singularisation' -the attribution of agency to specific components -is problematic, 9 and, unsurprisingly, is often the object of bitter jealousy and intense conflict. Its richness as a sociological topic has been demonstrated brilliantly by Godechot (2004) .
The example of the attribution of agency reflects the overall merits of the notion of 'agencement'. Used in a selective way, it can help trace linkages that are crucial in making up economic actors and framing contemporary economic life, thus throwing familiar phenomena into new light and uncovering surprising connections and underpinnings. Agencements constitute markets, and we cannot afford to treat them as black boxes. 9 We owe this way of framing the point to Fabian Muniesa. 
